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The folly of vengeance: 
Thinking through the 
Paris attacks with 
Simone de Beauvoir 




‘…we said ourselves in an outburst of anger ‘They will pay’. 
And our anger seemed to promise a joy so heavy that we 
could scarcely believe ourselves able to bear it. They have 
paid. They are going to pay. They pay each day. And the joy 
has not risen up in our hearts’.1
 
 
In the wake of the Paris attacks on November 13, 
international media highlighted how it was the deadliest 
attack since the Second World War, which was quickly 
rebutted when it was pointed out that up to 200 Algerians 
had been massacred in Paris in 1961 after protesting the 
colonial war in Algeria. Even if we believed every life 
mattered, the unequal mourning shown after the bombing in 
Beirut at day before the multiple attacks in Paris show how 
lives which are lost to violence appear or dis-appear in the 
public realm. 
 
While there has been criticism in the media and 
elsewhere about the history and politics that frames how lives 
matter and how all should matter (for instance Judith 
Butler’s Precarious Life) and how the law plays a key role by 
creating distinctions between worthy and unworthy lives to 
mourned (victim/criminal, combatant/civilian, 
terrorist/freedom fighter), the absence of Simone de 
Beauvoir’s voice in France’s contemporary challenges should 
not be a reason to forget her invitation to think critically 
about how we react when we are injured. 
 
As a prolific feminist author whose influence is well 
recognized, Beauvoir would seem for many to be an unlikely 
interlocutor to think through the current military response to 
the attacks: bombing Raqqa to the ground and the militaristic 
policing in Paris this week. However, it might be worth 
recalling that Beauvoir was a critic of the torture methods 
used by the French government in the French-Algerian war 
1954–1962.[2. Melissa M. Ptacek, “Simone de Beauvoir’s 
Algerian War: Torture and the Rejection of Ethics,” Theory 
and Society, November 4 (2015): 1-37.] Her approach to 
historical events and philosophy is grounded through 
phenomenology. Beauvoir states that her intention is ‘to 
merely translate […] a situation that is showing itself to be 
historical precisely in that it is in the process of changing’ 
without colonizing the experience of marginalized others.2
 
 
The leitmotif of ambiguity, which traverses most of her body 
of work, provides the gravitas shaping, problematizing and 
marking the limits of her thoughts and judgements on the 
political transformations she faced with others: WWII, the 
war in Algeria, women’s oppression, etc. More importantly, 
her critique of post-war punishment and liberal moral 





Recent engagements with Beauvoir’s work on ambiguity 
demonstrate the breadth of her method, encompassing 
themes that are not limited to gender and sexuality studies 
but also extend to questions of politics, moral philosophy, and 
ethics.[4. See: Anne Morgan, “Simone de Beauvoir’s Ethics of 
Freedom and Absolute Evil,” Hypatia 23, no. 4 (2008): 75–
89.] For Beauvoir, the human condition is marked by the 
‘tragedy of ambiguity,’ because it is an isolated subjective 
experience that nevertheless coexists ‘at the heart of the world 
with other men’.[5. Simone de Beauvoir, “Eye for an Eye,” 
258] Ambiguity is the frame that helps her understand the 
tensions arising from our relationship with others and the 
desire for freedom. Ambiguity evinces an impossible struggle 
between ethics and politics, where Beauvoir’s political subject 
moves through the world to impose a meaning while the 
ethical ‘acknowledges the mark of the other’. [6. Debra 
Bergoffen, “Between the Ethical and the Political: The 
Difference of Ambiguity,” In The Existential Phenomenology 
of Simone de Beauvoir, edited by Wendy O’Brien and Lester 
Embree (Dordrecht: Springer Science & Business Media, 
2001), 188.] 
 
One of the most interesting implications of her emphasis on 
ambiguity is how it unsettles the values ascribed to the theory 
and practice of punishment. Crime and punishment as much 
as war and peace, delineate the borders of this intersubjective 
dilemma. They represent ways in which the intersubjective 
world is denied by imposing one meaning over another. In 
the essay ‘Eye for an Eye’ (1946), Beauvoir seeks to make 
sense of the trial and execution of Robert Brasillach – a 
French intellectual who collaborated with the Germans by 
publishing a fascist newspaper. More than just an occasion 
piece, this essay is a pillar in Beauvoir’s work as she alludes to 
ambiguity for the first time. [7. Kristiana Arp, “Eye for an Eye: 
Introduction by Kristiana Arp,” In Simone de Beauvoir: 
Philosophical Writings, edited by Margaret Simmons, 
Marybeth Timmerman, and Mary Beth Mader (Urbana and 
Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2004), 237 –260.] 
 
Embracing revenge and resisting revenge: Two 
different Parises 
 
The State’s penal machinery set in motion after the Paris 
attacks bears all the characteristics of revenge, pure and 
simple. By November 18, France struck back with airstrikes in 
Raqqa, ISIL’s de facto base. A week before, the city had been 
also pounded by Russian bombs which destroyed the national 
hospital. 
 
Revenge, whilst denounced as barbaric—as something that 
criminal courts and scholarship in post-Enlightenment 
Europe abandoned through its sublimation into ‘retributive 
justice’—it reserves a strong place in the philosophical 
imaginary of criminal legal doctrine and in international law. 
Even though retributive justice holds on to the belief that 
proportionality delivers a relative equivalence, Beauvoir 
shows how punishment is always asymmetrical because it is 
justified on something other than the crime itself. 
 
In ‘Eye for an Eye,’ she argues that revenge appeals since it is 
something that ‘retains a whiff of magic’ that ‘strives to satisfy 
some unknown dark god of symmetry’.[8. Simone de 
Beauvoir, “Eye for an Eye,” 247.] But revenge cannot bring 
the satisfaction one would hope for, even in the case of the 
most horrible crimes where perpetrators objectify others by 
reducing them into ‘mere panting flesh’. [9. De Beauvoir 
reflected on this through the experience of the rape of 
Djamila Boupacha in the Algerian War. See: Sonia 
Kruks, Simone de Beauvoir and the Politics of 
Ambiguity (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 162.] 
‘True’ revenge emerges spontaneously. It is a ‘metaphysical’ 
demand which has ‘no goal outside of itself’. [10. Simone de 
Beauvoir, “Eye for an Eye,” 248.] For example, where a victim 
can reverse the master-bondsman relationship.[11. Sonia 
Kruks, Simone de Beauvoir and the Politics of 
Ambiguity (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012).] But 
even there, revenge could devolve into torture since 
punishment can never restore what was lost. Revenge 
achieves only a temporal reversal by forcing others to see 
their own tragic ambiguity, rather than appealing to their 
freedom. Beauvoir does not suggest punishment can be 
avoided, especially if the offender threatens to cause more 
harm in a community. The problem with revenge is that it is 
deeply contradictory, pursuing an impossible equation that 
can only be satisfied in fiction books. The failure of 
punishment is best exemplified by the ‘elaborate forms’ 
created by society to envelope the spontaneity required for 
revenge, including the law and criminal justice institutions. 
 
Legal punishment retains the ‘whiff of magic’ of revenge 
because it is a metaphysical aspiration that always aims at 
something beyond itself, such as the abstract morality of a 
formalistic law or the political ends that characterize 
utilitarianism. As such, it is bound to fail.For example, she 
likens criminal courts to vigilantes avenging an injury of an 
anonymous universal ‘other’, while at the same time acting 
like a sovereign consciousness with the authority to make 
others pay for a crime. When the offenders appears in court, 
they are no longer the sovereign consciousness that acted 
regardless of the harm to others. Instead, they are fragile 
individuals whose punishment is justified through something 
other than the crime itself. Punishment devolves into the 
state’s will to punish while the offender’s subjectivity becomes 
an ‘abstract symbol’ of the values rejected by society. Since 
the spontaneity of revenge faded down, trials legitimize the 
authority of the law through ‘a comedy of words’ whereby the 
whole process is ‘designed to endow the sentence with the 
greatest expressive power possible’.[12. Simone de Beauvoir, 
“Eye for an Eye,” 252.] In other words, criminal justice is an 
empty performance lacking a body and cut off from the brief 
temporality of the offence. To understand her critique, we 
need to situate her analysis of revenge within the framework 
of embodiment. Embodiment is situated in an ever-changing 
temporality, which in the case of crime, essentially creates a 
distance between the offender and the offence. Punishment 
can only grasp a ‘mirage of exteriority’.[13. Ibid., 255.] What 
is left is an abstract justice haunted by failure because it 
ceased to link the crime to the punishment. 
 
This failure is not due to a lack of ideas. The failure is not 
realizing how the justification of punishment through a 
perfect equivalence has been always impossible. Yet, the 
ambiguity of punishment is masked in order to legitimize it. 
The ethical and political struggle is a constant. Beauvoir’s 
lesson is in her method of critique: By staging the 
impossibility of equivalence at every stage of the analysis, she 
is also resisting the compelling passion of revenge and the 
alluring purity of abstract legal processes. Her reading 
compels us to abandon and constantly question facile 
equivalences in penal discourses that offer the ‘serene 
recovery of a reasonable and just order’.[14. Ibid., 259.] 
 
The penal equation cannot achieve that goal, as the Paris 
attacks and the responses to attacks themselves demonstrate: 
Mosques vandalized in Canada and the US, multinational war 
coalitions bombing Iraq and Syria, and President Hollande’s 
vow to ‘destroy’ IS, and ISIL’s equal vow to  terrorize France 
and everyone else. 
 
While the political protagonists (ISIL and elected leaders) get 
absorbed in the old-age cycle of revenge, allegedly cleansed by 
metaphysical reasons (the aspiration for something beyond 
the crime itself), people in 11th arrondisment and even those 
directly affected seem to understand better the core of 
Beauvoir’s reflection about post-war Paris. That is, their 
interdependence and the need to undercut and deflate what 
Judith Butler calls ‘the terrible satisfactions of war’, best 
represented by a statement which is going viral in social 
media made by a man whose wife was killed at the 
Bataclan:‘Vous n’aurez pas ma haine’ (‘I will not grant you the 
gift of my hatred’). Perhaps even stronger than the 
metaphysical need for revenge, there is a more earthly 
concern at play. Echoing the tragic ambiguity of co-existence 
in Beauvoir’s essay on punishment, Judith Butler articulates 
more clearly what is at stake. Drawing on Melanie Klein, 
Butler argues that if ‘individuation is never complete, and 
dependency never really overcome, a broader ethical dilemma 
emerges: how not to destroy the other or others whom I need 
in order to live’.[15. Judith Butler, “‘The Death Penalty’ by 
Jacques Derrida, Translated by Peggy Kamuf,” London 
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